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NOTES
THE NATURE AND STATUS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC
SEVICE CoMMISsoN-The recent case of Commonwealth v. Benn I
was an action of quo warranto against James S. Benn, who had been
appointed to the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission in 192o,
for a term of ten years. On July 3o, 1925, he was summarily dismissed by the Governor of Pennsylvania, who claimed to exercise the
authority granted by Art. VI, Sec. 4, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania---"All appointed officers, other than judges of the courts of
record and the Superintendent of Public Instruction, may be removed at the pleasure of the power that appointed them." The Public Service Law 2 expressly provides that the Commissioners shall be
appointed "by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate" 2 and "the Governor, by and with the consent c.£ the
Senate, may remove any commissioner . . . for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or misconduct in office, giving him a copy of the charges
against him, and affording him an opportunity to be publicly heard
. . . in his own defense." 4 The defendant claimed that, by force
of this Statute, he could not be dismissed by the Governor without a
hearing, etc., and refused to vacate his office. This action was then
brought. The State contended that the appointing power was vested
in the Governor by the wording of the Act,5 and that therefore the
removal clause was unconstitutional, because antagonistic to Art. VI,
Sec. 4, since it prevented the Governor removing at his pleasure,
To this the defendant replied that the Commissioners were judges of
a court of record, and that the Governor and Senate jointly, and not
the Governor alone, constituted the appointing power. The questions before the Court were (I) the status of the Public Service
Commission-whether it was a court of record and the Commissioners were judges thereof and (2) if they were not judges of a court
of record and thereby were expressly within the purview of Art. VI,
Sec. 4, what power had appointed them. In holding that the dismissal of the defendant was an improper act of the Executive, the
Court decided that (I) the Public Service Commission is not a court
of record, but is an agency of the legislature to do legislative work;
and that (2) the legislature alone was the appointing power, having
delegated to the Governor, as its agent, the duty of appointment.
(I) The nature of the Commission--It is necessary to understand, before entering into any discussion of Public Service Commissions, that they are created by statutes that vary in each jurisdic'Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, November 23, 1925.
'Act of 1913, P. L. 1374, Pa. St. 192o, § 8o57 et seq.
'Ibid., Art. IV, § 2, Pa. St. 192o, § x8io6.
'Ibid., Art. IV,,§ IS, Pa. St. 192o, § 1811g.
'Citing' Lane v. Commonwealth, 1o3 Pa. 481 (883); Seltzer v. Fertig,

237 Pa. 514, 85 AtL 86

(xgxa).
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tion, and that the powers of each must be determined by the statute
which created it. Except in the discussion of constitutional problems, no generalizations can be made.
A fundamental theory of our Government is the division of
governmental functions into three great heads-the legislative, which
makes the laws, the judiciary, which expounds them, and the executive, who enforces them. This division is found, either expressly
or by implication, in the Federal Constitution and in the constitutions
of every State, the majority of state constitutions containing express
separation clauses.7 But in the practical application of this principle, it has always been realized that total separation was an academic
theory, 8 since constitutions provide, in several places, for the exercise,
by one branch of the Government,. of the functions of another. Conspicuous among these are the appointing power of the legislature,
and the legislative power of veto which is granted to the executive.
In Georgia and Illinois, the courts have appointing power,9 and in
New York, until the creation of the Court of Appeals, in 1846, a
committee of the Senate was a part of the court of ultimate jurisdiction.10 In the search for practical agencies, the antithesis of this
theory has been reached in the adoption of the public utilities commission since this is a frank union of all branches in one body.- Never'See MoNTEsQUIEU, EsPrwT DES Lois, book xi, c. 6. "There is no liberty if
the judiciary be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it
joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be the legislator." MuIsoN,
FEDERnATsT No. 47; Beall v. Beall, 8 Ga. 210 (185o); Kilbourn v. Thompson,
io3 U. S. 168, at p. igo (188o); Gibson, C. J., in Greenough v. Greenough, ix
Pa. 489, at p. 494 (849).
'All except Kansas, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington and

Wisconsin. In Massachusetts there is the following strong statement: "The

legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers or
either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial
powers or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and
executive powers or either of them; to the end that there may be a government of laws and not of men." Mass. Rev. Laws, (x9o) 22, Pt. x, Art. xxx.
'SToRY, CoNsTrrUnoN, (sth Ed.) 393, 395; Beall v. Beall, supra, note 6;
Wayman v. Southard, xo Wheat. x (U. S., 1825), Marshall, C. J., at p. 46.
'Russell v. Cooley, 69 Ga. 215, at p. 217 (1883); People v. Nelson, x33
Ill. 565, at p. 6oi, 27 N. E. 217, at p. 226 (i8go). In both these states there
are separation clauses in the Constitution almost as strong as that of Massachusetts, supra, note 7.
" ScoTT, THE CouRTs OF THE STATE op NEw Yomx, 32r.
'State v. Public Service Commission, 94 Wash. 274, 162 Pac. 523 (1917).
For comment on the result of the introduction of Commission government, see
C. E. McBride, Evolution of Government by Commission and Decline of the
Judiciary, 49 CHIc. LEG. NEWS i90; Freund, Commission Powers and Public
Utilities, 9 A. B. A. JouR. 285; C. W. Needham (Counsel for the I. C. C.),
JudicialDeterminations by Administrative Commissions, io Am. Po. ScL Rnv.
235; Pound, ConstitutionalAspects of American Administrative Law, 9 A. B.
A. JouR. 409 (note his definition of administrative law as a branch of the
executive department).
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theless, it seems to be a necessary form of governmental activity for
the purpose of coping with the problems of an industrial era.
The Pennsylvania Commission, like all others of a similar na12
ture, is primarily concerned with the fixing of rates for the future.
13
It is recognized that the fixing of rates is a legislative function, so
that the act of the Commission would at first glance seem to be a
violation of the constitutional bar to the delegation of legislative
powers.14 Ever since commissions have been established, courts have
been busy explaining away this difficulty. The usual method has
been to hold that there is no delegation of legislative power; that the
delegation is only of the "legislative discretion" or of the carrying
out of the administrative details necessary to fulfilling the will of the
legislature.' 5 This would come within the rule permitting the legislature to delegate to subordinate bodies such other duties, not legislative in nature, as it may have.'8 The premise of this theory is that
the determinations of the commissions are only the detail work and
are not the making of laws, because the law comes from the legislature in its complete form. By this process of reasoning, the courts
are able to hold that the acts of the commissions, though legislative
" Act of 19q, P. L. 1374, Art. V, § I, Pa. St. ig2o, § 18125; slightly
amended by Act of 1921, § 2, P. L. 43, Pa. St. Supp. 1924, § 18125.
"Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. H23 (1876); I. C. C. v. C. N. 0. & T. P.
R. R., 167 U. S.479, at p. 499 (1896) ; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352
(1912): Ann Arbor R. R. v. Fellows, 236 Fed. 387, at p. 390 (D. C., 196),
where the court says that it cannot interfere with an order of the rate-making
body (in this case a Railroad Commission) unless it has committed a legislative
theft; C. B. & Q. R. R. v. Jones, r49 Ill.
362, at p. 377, 37 N. E. 247, at p. 251
(i894); McGrew v. R. R., 230 Mo. 496, at p. 523, 132 S. W. io76, at p. 2O83
(igio) ; Saratoga v. Saratoga Co., 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693 (x9o8) ; Madison v. Madison G. & E. Co., 129 Wis. 249, at p. 265, iO8 N. W. 65, at p. 68
(igo6).
'Field v. Clark, 143 . S.649 (i8gi); Wayman v. Southard, su pra, note
8, p. 43; Boston v. Chelsea, 212 Mass. 127, 98 N. E. 62o (1912) ; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 (1873) ; State v. P. S.C., 94 Wash. 274, 162 Pac. 523 (2917);
Union Bridge Co. v. U. S.,

204

U. S. 364 (igo7), citing Locke's Appeal, supra;

I. C. C. v. Goodrich Transit Co.; 224 U. S. i94 (922).
See Cheadle, Delegation of Legislative Functions,27 YALE L. J. 892.
"I.C. C. v. Goodrich Transit Co., supra, note 14; Chicago, etc., R. R. v.
Dey, 35 Fed. 866, at p. 874 (C. C., 2888); McWhorter v. R. R., 24 Fla. 417,
at p. 474, 5 So. 129, at p. 137 (1888) ; Georgia R. R. v. R. R. Com., 7o Ga. 694,

at p. 699 (2883) ; C. B. & Q. R. R. v. Jones, supra, note 13, at p. 378, 37 N. E.,
at p. 251; State v. C. M. & St. P. R. R., 38 Minn. 281, at pp. 300-302, 37 N. W.
782, at pp. 787-788 (1888) ; State v. F. E. & W. R. R., 22 Neb. 313, 35 N. W.
i8 (1887) ; W. J. & S. S. R. R. v. P. U. C., 87 N. J. L. 17o, at p. 177, 94
Adt. 57, at p. 6o (1915) ; Saratoga v. Saratoga Co., x91 N. Y. 223, at p. 238,
83 N. E. 693, at p. 697 (igo8); Express Co. v. R. R., iii N. C. 463, at pp.
472-473, 16 S. E. 393, at pp. 393-394 (1892).
'In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1896); Union Bridge Co. v. U. S., 204
U. S.364 (igo7); Iowa L. I. Co. v. Eastern Mutual L. I. Co., 64 N. J.L.
340, at pp. 346-347, 45 At. 762, at p. 764 (1899) ; In re N. Y. Elev. Co., 7o N. Y.
327, at p. 343 (2877); Locke's Appeal, supra, note 14; State v. P. S. C., 94
Wash. 274, x62 Pac. 523 (97). See Wayman v. Southard, supra, note 8, p. 42.
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In the Benn
in nature, are not delegations of legislative power.'
Case, however, the court says, "this passing on of authority was unifortnly sanctioned by the courts as an exception to the general rule
that legislative power cannot be delegated." It may be doubted
whether the decisions go this far, although the modern tendency",
is to pay less and less attention to artificial distinctions. In Pennof
sylvania, therefore, the Public Service Commission is a branch
work.
legislative
do
to
power
delegated
properly
with
legislature
the
The Pennsylvania Commission, like most others, has additional
duties. It is to make reparation orders; '1 to determine the damages
20 to deter22
caused by improper acts of public service corporations;
to impose fines.
mine the damages from alteration of crossings; 21
23
These are described as judicial or quasi-judicial, and are the basis
for the defendant's argument that the Commission is a court of record. The practice in this state, which is the general practice in other
an appeal to an appellate court, usually the
jurisdictions, is to permit
2
court of last resort. ' The court on appeal will not review all the
" In England there is no such difficulty, since there is no constitutional bar
to the delegation of legislative powers. Local Gov. Board v. Arlidge, [igs]
the
A. C. 120. Madison v. Madison Co., supra, note 13, seems to hold that
legislative power to control and make rates may be delegated, the court saying,
at p. 265, "this power of the state is in its nature legislative, and has always
or
been exercised either directly by the legislative branch of the government
by delegation of it to municipal corporations or some other appropriate agency."
To support this statement they cite five cases. In Ruggles v. People, 9i Ill.
(897),
256 (1878); Winchester Co. v. Croxton, 98 Ky. 739, 34 S. W. 518delegation
and Olmstead v. Proprietors, 47 N. J.L. 311 (x885), there was no
at all, the cases discussing the right of the legislature to control public corporations. In Sternberg v. State, 36 Neb. 307, 54 N. W. 553 (1893) and Cincinnati, etc., R. R. v. Bowling Green, 57 Ohio 336, 49 N. E. 121 (I897), the
delegation is spoken of as police power. Although the above case looks toward
the statement of the court in the instant case, on analysis it is found to mean
only that the control of public corporations, while essentially legislative, is
really part of the polire power, and therefore properly delegable by the legislature. It is only another example of the distinctions made to avoid the constitutional bar.
U That courts were undoubtedly leaning that way is seen in the late decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. "In creating such an administrative agency, the legislature, to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative power, must enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and certain rules
of decision in the performance of its function." Wichita R. R. v. P. U. C., 26o
U. S.48, at p. 59 (1922). The distinction here has almost reached the vanishing point.
Act of 1913, P. L. 1374, Art. V, § 5, Pa. St. i92O, § 18129.

Ibid.

' Act of 1917, § x, P. L. 1O25, Pa. St. 1920, § 18138.
" See Act of 1913, P. L. 1374, Art. VI, § 43, Pa. St. I920, § 18205.
'Prentiss v. A. C. L., 2H1 U. S. 210 (1908).
"First to the Superior Court. Act of 1915, P. L. 779, § 3, Pa. St. 1920, §

18178. On constitutional questions there may be a further appeal to the Supreme Court. Act of 1917, P. L. 8o8, § 2, Pa. St. 192o, § 18192; Ohio Valley
ater Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (I919); W. Va. Co. v. P. S.
South
C., 6I Pa. Super. 555 (1915). An extraordinary situation has arisen in decree
Dakota where the Supreme Court has held that no appeal lies from the
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facts as found by the Commission, but considers its finding prim,
facie correct, and confines itself to the justiciable points of the record;
usually, whether there has been an error of law or a violation of the
Constitution by the Commission. 25 There will be no reversal except
if "a hearing was denied; if that granted was inadequate or manifestly
unfair; if the finding was contrary to the 'indisputable character of
the evidence' or if the facts found do hot, as a matter of law, support the order made." 28 The Pennsylvania Commission, however,
cannot punish for contempt, 27 nor can it enforce its decrees without
going to a court of law 28 and the Supreme Court of the United States
has held the decree of the Commission on a constitutional question,
29
without possibility of review, a violation of the "due process" clause.
The difficulty of determining the exact status of the Commission on
this evidence is another example of the problem confronting those
who attempt to fit commission government into our present grouping.
Modem industrial conditions require the commission. It would be
impracticable for the legislature to undertake to deal with individual
rate problems, and some other solution of the difficulty must be found.
As sometimes happens, the legal and constitutional warrant .for the
of the
Public Utilities Commission must derive from the realities
80
situation, rather than from the academic theory of the past.
of the P. S. C., since by their Constitution, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court exists only for appeals from lower courts; and since the P. S. C.
is not a court, no appeal can be taken. Milling Co. v. R. R., 43 S. D. 574, 181
N.

W.

x95

(igai).

"Act of 1913, P. L. 1374, Art. VI, §§ 22-23, Pa. St. i92o, §§ x1884-5. I. C.
C. v. U. P. R. R., 2= U. S. 541, at p. 547 (xixz), "In determining these

mixed questions of law and fact, the court confines itself to the ultimate question as to whether the commission acted within its power. It will not consider the wisdom or expediency of the order or whether, on like testimony, it
would have made a similar decree." Proctor & Gamble v. U. S., 225 U. S.
282, at pp. 297-298 (Igxi); People v. McCall, 219 N. Y. 84, 113 N. E. 795
(xx6) ; Hocking Valley R. R. v. P. U. C., 92 Ohio 362, x1o N. E. 521 (x915).
7I. C. C. v. L. & N. R. R., 227 U. S. 88, at p. 91 (1913); see article by
E. F. Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 35 HAnv. L.
REv. 127.
" This must be done by the Court of Common Pleas. Act of 1913, P. L.
1374, Art. VI, §§ 3-4, Pa. St. 192o, §§ 18i64-x865.
g Common Pleas of Dauphin Co. Act of igis, P. L. 779, § 3, Pa. St. 1920,
§ x8x95.
a Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, supra, note 24. Accord:
Chicago, etc., R. R. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1889); I. C. C. v. L. & N.
. L, 227 U. S. 88 (913).
"For criticism of the commission form of government, see Harmon v.
State, 66 Ohio 249, 253, 64 N. E. 117 (x9oa), and x6 Iu. L. REv. 481, "Commissions are all examples of legalized mob-rule, and their decisions are frankly
political rather than judicial . . . The Public Utilities Commission from the
very natur of its organization is recognized to be the political instrument of
the utilities affected . . . If our courts as now constituted are slow, let us
solve one defect at a time; let us increase the number of courts or the number
of terms of court or take such further steps as we may deem necessary. But
above all, let us adhere to that fundamental historical foundation of democratic
government--the localized and unspecialized administration of justice."
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In many jurisdictions there is a definite expression of opinion regarding the nature of this type of commission. It has been held to
be an administrative agency or arm of the legislature; 31 a body with
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions; 82 an arm of the police
3
power of the state; s not a court in any sense of the word; a body
35
with administrative, legislative, executive and judicial functions;
38
Coast
v.
Atlantic
Prentiss
In
a body for some purposes a court.
Line5 7 in discussing the status of the Virginia Corporation Commission, a body very similar to our Commission, Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the majority of the court, says, "the commission ay
be, for some purposes, a court." Chief Justice Fuller and Justice
Harlan held that the Commission was a court in every sense of the
word. But the majority view, and, it is submitted, the better view,
is that commissions similar to that in Pennsylvania are not courts of
law.
.State v. Lewis, 187 Ind. 564, 12o N. E. 129 (1918) ; Mo. So. R. R. v. P.
S. C., 279 Mo. 484, 214 S. W. 379 (i919) ; R. R. Com. v. Ry., go Tex. 34o,

38 S. W. 750 0896).
' Prentiss v. A. C. L., supra, note 23; Re Conn. Co., 89 Conn. 528, 94 AtL
992 (igi5) ; State v. B. & 0. R. R., 76 W. Va. 399, 85 S. E. 714 (i916).
'Robertson v. Traction Co., 7 Boyce i55, io4 Atl. 839 (Del., 1918) ; Tel.
Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio 358, 12z N. E. 701 (i918).
"4R. R. Comm. v. R. R., 182 Ala. 357, 62 So. 749 (19Wr); Pub. Util. Comm.
Title & Trust Co., 65 Colo. 472, 178 Pac. 6 (igi8) ; Lumber Co.
Colorado
v.
v. P. U. C., 39 Idaho 505, 228 Pac. 271 (1924). Taft, C. J., in Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181 (192i), referring to the Kansas Industrial Relations Court,
says, at p. 183: "The board, miscalled a court." T. & P. R. R. v. Ry. Com.,
137 La. io59, 69 So. 837 (i925); Hamilton v. Caribou W. L. & P. Co., 121
Me. 422, 117 Atl. 582 (1922) ; State v. P. S. C., 303 Mo. 212, 259 S. W. 445
(924) ; Public Service El. Co. v. P. U. C., 88 N. J. L. 6o3, 96 Atl. 1013 (i916) ;

Bronx G. & E. Co. v. P. S. C., Igo App. Div. i3, i8o N. Y. Supp. 38 (9i9);
In re Marysville L. & W. Co., P. U. R. i9i5D 374, affirmed per curiamin 93
Ohio 48o, 113 N. E. io7i (i916); Dennison v. Municipal Gas Co., 257 S. W.
616 (Tex., 1924); Bessette v. Goddard, 87 Vt. 77, 88 At!. I (924); Waukesha G. & E. Co. v. R. R. Com., i8i Wis. 281, 194 N. We. 846 (1923); M.
K. &T. R. R. v. I. C. C., 164 Fed. 645 (C. C., i9o8). The Interstate Commerce
Commission itself, in 20 I. C. C. 307 (i911), says at p. 315, "It must be borne
in mind that this Commission is not a court of law." The reasoning in Pub.
Util. Com. v. Springfield G. & E. Co., 291 Ill. 209, 125 N. E. 89i (2920),
might induce that court to hold the Commission to be a court of law if that
issue should squarely arise. The court says, at p. 216, "There is no reason
why the members of the Public Utilities Commission of this state should not
develop and establish a system of rules and precedents as wise and beneficial
within their sphere of action as those established by the early common-law
judges . .. There should be ascribed to them the strength due to a judgment of
a tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience."
"Muskogee G. & E. Co. v. State, 8i Okla. 176, 186 Pac. 73o (i92r); affirmed on rehearing, 86 Okla. 58, 2o6 Pac.

242 (1922).

"N. & P. B. L. R. R. v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 289, 49 S. E. 39, 55 S. E.
572 (1904); Commonwealth v. A. C. L., io6 Va. 6r (29o6). This view was
held not unconstitutional in Prentiss v. A. C. L., supra, note 23.
"Supra, note 23.
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With this view the Pennsylvania Court is in accord, saying, "certainly our commission is not, in the words of the Constitution, a court
of record," and further, "We conclude that the Pennsylvania commission is not a court in any true sense of the term, and cannot be
identified as such." In addition to this negative description, the court
affirmatively defines the Commission by saying, "public service commissioners must be viewed as deputies of the General Assembly to
perform legislative work." This definition fails to include the quasijudicial functions as given above. If the Commission is such agent
of the Legislature, there is some difficulty in justifying its exercise of
duties which the Legislature itself could not perform. It would seem
that the work of imposing fines, determining damages, and making
reparation orders is not work that the Legislature could perform, being distinctly non-legislative in character. But since the authority of
the Commission is not final, but in all these matters is a mere preliminary to judicial action, the criticism does not seem serious.
(2) The legislature as the appointing power-By the authority
of Lane v. Commonwealth 8 and Seltzer v. Fertig,39 the State argued
that the language "appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate" gave the Governor the sole appointing
power, and made the removal clause unconstitutional, since it prevented the Governor from removing at pleasure. It is an elementary
rule of statutory construction that statutes are presumptively constitutional, and the courts will attempt to find a construction which
can give effect to the will of the Legislature without violating the
Constitution.4" It was within the power of the court in this case to
find an interpretation of the Public Service Company Law which
could reconcile both the appointing and removal clauses with Art. VI,
Sec. 4.
The defendant offered two theories. First, that the interpretation given these words .in the Lane and Seltzer cases did not necessarily govern this case, and that the whole tenor of the Act justified
the belief that the Governor and Senate jointly were the appointing,
and therefore the removing, power. Secondly, that certain Pennsylvania cases "I had recognized a distinction between "constitutional"
and "legislative" offices. The former were such offices as were expressly mentioned in the Constitution, or which could be found therein
by implication or analogy. The latter were such other offices cre"Supra, note 5.
Supra, note 5.
Knight's Templar Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U. S. i97 (i9oa) ; United
States v. D. & H. Co., 213 U. S. 366 (19o8); Sage v. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. x89
(1882) ; Commonwealth v. Butler, 99 Pa. 535 (x882) ; Commonwealth v. Herr,
229 Pa. 132, 78 Atl. 68 (i9io).

'Commonwealth v. Weir, 165 Pa. 284, 3o At. 835 (i895); Bowman's
Case, 225 Pa. 364, 74 Atl. 203 (19o9); Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 254 Pa. 45,
98 At. 782 (igi6); Commonwealth v. Reid, 265 Pa. 328, io8 Atl. 829 (igig);
Commonwealth v. Tice, 282 Pa. 595, 128 AtI. 5o6 (1925).
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ated by legislative enactment as did not belong in the "constitutional" class. These cases had ruled that the "legislative" offices were
exempt from the provisions of Art. VI, Sec. 4; that there was no
Constitutional power of removal at pleasure; and that any causes of
removal specified in the Act creating the office, were exclusive.
The court agreed that the construction to be given to the wording
in this Act need not necessarily be the same as that in the Lane and
Seltzer cases, and that the whole Act should be considered to determine where the Legislature had intended to vest the appointing power.
But they decided the case on a ground not suggested by the defendant,
viz., that since the Commission was a delegate of the Legislature to
do legislative work, the Legislature itself was the appointing power.
They held further that since the Legislature was not in session at all
times, some agency would have to be appointed that would always be
available; for this purpose the Governor was the logical and proper
person, he being an "integral part of the law-making power of the
State." 42 His function was to initiate appointments and removals
subject to the approval of the Senate. This agency theory is a novel
one, and a discussion of it presents certain difficulties.
.

The court says "the Legislature . . . chose him as its agent
. in . . . removing such representatives, subject to its ulti-

mate approval, to be expressed by a vote of the Senate." This would
seem to indicate that the act of the Governor alone is ineffective as a
removal, even though he should follow the procedure prescribed in
the act. If this is correct, no removal is possible while the Senate is
in recess. The act of the Governor is only a preliminary, as above;
the Senate cannot affirm it, not being in session; the Commissioner,
even though found guilty of the offenses mentioned in the Act 'as
cause for removal, may continue to sit, as he has not been removed;
no "vacancy" has occurred, which would entitle the Governor to make
an interim appointment. This is a grave practical difficulty, which
can only be solved by amendment to the Act, since the court's construction of the removal clause requires affirmance by the Senate. In
addition to this practical problem, two constitutional questions arise.
If, as the court says, the Legislature is the appointing power,
and the Commissioners are appointed officers within the meaning of
Art. VI, Sec. 4, the Legislature can remove them "at pleasure." It
is true that the Legislature has limited the right of removal to certain specified causes, but it is not certain that they have abrogated
their right to remove at pleasure. It might well be argued that the
Legislature could, at any time, summarily dismiss a Commissioner,
invoking their constitutional privilege. Had the court found a construction of the Act that would place the Commissioners outside of
Art. VI, Sec. 4, no right to remove at pleasure would exist, and an
amendment to the Act would be necessary to alter the causes of removal.
" Commonwealth v. Barnett, i99 Pa. x6r, at p. i69, 49 AtI. 976 (igoi).
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The power of appointment is recognized as being ordinarily an
executive function,'" but by the weight of authority it is not so exclusively executive that the Legislature cannot reserve it to itself."
Conceding for purposes of argument that the Pennsylvania Assembly
may do this, is there enough evidence in this case to show an intention on the part of the Legislature to remove this power from the
Governor and to vest it in itself ? The court finds this intention from
the legislative nature of the office, arguing that if the Commission is
a delegate of the Legislature to do legislative work, the Legislature
could appoint the Commissioners itself. Therefore when they mentioned the Governor in the appointing clause, they intended him only
as agent. This does not necessarily follow, and it is doubtful if the
mere nature of the office is enough, in the absence of an express intention to reserve the appointing power.
The court does not discuss the worth of the distinction between
"constitutional" and "legislative" offices.41 If the distinction is of
any value, the court could have arrived at the same result as to the
impropriety of 'the Governor's act, without suggesting the difficulties
presented above. Since the Commission is, by the words of the
Court, an exception to the Constitution, the office of Commissioner is
certainly not "constitutional," as being one within the conception of
the Constitution. It is therefore a "legislative" office, and outside the
rule of Art. VI, Sec. 4. Had this theory been used to decide the
case, and the same construction given to the words of the Act as was
given in the Lane and Seltzer cases, the following result would have
been reached: the Governor would have been both the appointing
and removing power, but would have been limited to removing (by
and with the consent of the senate) for the causes specified in the
Act; he would have ng constitutional power to remove at pleasum
The practical difficulty given above would not be solved, since the
affirmance of the senate would still be required. The constitutional
questions, however, could not exist because the Legislature would
have no constitutional right to remove at pleasure, nor would there
be any encroachment on the executive power of appointment.
P. W.A.
'State v. Hyde, 121 Ind. 20, 22 N. E. 644 (1889) ; Lasher v. People, x83
Ill.
26, 55 N. E. 663 (x899); State v. Brill, ioo Minn. 499, 111 N. W. 294
(19D7).

" People v. Freeman, 8o Cal. 233, 22 Pac. 173 (1889); Kilgour v. Com.,
Ill. 342 (1884); People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (187); Achley's Case,
4 Abb. Pr. 35 (N. Y., 1856); Shoemaker v. U. S., 147 U. S. 282 (x893). But
in some jurisdictions it is so exclusively executive that any attempt to vest it
in anyone but the Governor is unconstitutional. State v. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76,
22 A t. 686 (1885) ; State v. Washburn, x67 Mo. 68o, 67 S. W. 592 (1902). The
Pennsylvania view is uncertain; there seem to be no decisions.
in

"See cases cited supra, note 41.

NOTES
THE HUSBAND'S LIABILITY FOR

His

WIFE'S TORTS AS AFFECTED

BY THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACTs-In the recent case of

Sargeant v. Fedor,' the Supreme Court of New Jersey bad to pass
upon the ever-perplexing question of the liability of a husband for
his wife's tort. Mrs. Fedor had called the plaintiff a thief, and the
court held her husband jointly liable for the slander, even though it
was the voluntary tort of the wife, and not uttered in her husband's
presence nor at his command. The decision conforms to the common
law rule, which the court held unchanged by the general property acts
relating to married women.
While it is undoubtedly true that at common law the husband
was liable for his wife's torts, it is, curiously enough, very difficult
to ascertain with any degree of certainty the precise grounds on which
this immemorial rule of law was really based. The usual explanation,
offered in one form or another in most of the leading cases on the
subject, is that husband and wife were considered one person, and that
that person was the husband, so that the torts of the wife must be
deemed to be those of the husband, who must, accordingly, be sued.
But this explanation assumes a lack of persona on the part of
the wife which never really existed in the Middle Ages, when the rule
grew up. The personality of a wife was not submerged in that of
her husband, as is often erroneously stated; rather, her relation was
that of a vassal to her lord, and all her husband's medieval rights and
liabilities in respect of his wife were simply those of any other superior in respect of his vassal. It was her duty to serve and obey; his
to provide subsistence and protection, and it was this obligation to
protect that rendered him liable in law for ier torts '--whether committed in or out of his presence, or whether at his command or not.3
A few states have adopted statutes expressly providing that a
husband shall not be liable for his wife's torts committed without his
participation. 4 But in practically all the States and in England, the
common law status of the wife has been changed only by the enactment of the so-called married women's property acts. These provide
in broad terms that the disabilities and privileges of coverture shall
be removed, vesting a married woman with absolute dominion over
her property and person, and authorizing her to sue and be sued as if
sole.
These statutes have received different interpretations in the various states. Perhaps a slight majority, applying the principle that
13o

Atl. 207 (N. J., x925).

'69 Sol. J. 390, 392.
'Slander-Fitzgerald v. Quann, iag N. Y. 441, 17 N. E. 354 (1888); conversion-Heckle v. Lurvey, ioi Mass. 344 (1869) ; assault and battery-Henley v. Wilson, 137 Cal. 273, 70 Pac. 21 (1go2) ; trespass-Handy v. Foley, zIa
Mass. 259 (1876).
'Ala. Civ. Code (1923), § 8266; Strouse v. Leipf, IOI Ala. 433, 14 So.
667 (1893). Mass. Acts i871, ch. 312; Austin v. Cox, II8 Mass. 58 (1875);
McCarty v. De Best, i20 Mass. 89 (1876). R. I. Gen. Laws (igog), ch. 246,
§ 312; MacElroy v. Capron, 24 R. I. 561, 54 Atl. gg (I9O2).
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statutes changing the common law should be strictly construed, hold
that the common law is abrogated no further than the clear import
of the language used in the statute requires, and that they do not,
unless clearly so provided, relieve the husband of liability for the
tortious acts of his wife.0 This is also the English view.,
But many of the states which hold to this doctrine of the husband's common law liability qualify it'to the extent that the wife
alone is liable where statutes have empowered her to hold and manage real and personal estate as if she were a feme sole, and the tort
grows out of her management of her separate estate. Thus, under
such statutes, a husband has been held not liable to a guest in his
wife's hotel for injuries received in an elevator accident in the hotel,'
and not liable for injuries caused by a vicious dog kept by the wife
on her premises.$ This exception grows out of the fact that the
statute treats the wife as unmarried in regard to such property, and,
as all the rights of an unmarried woman are 9conferred upon her,
all correlative obligations are likewise imposed.
On the other hand, a number of courts, constituting a rather large
minority, are of opinion that the married women's property acts. abrogate the common law rule of the husband's liability, even though this
is not expressly provided by the acts. The reasoning on which this
view is based is that the legislature, by giving the wife the right to
control her own time, to manage her separate estate, and to contract
in matters concerning it, as well as to sue and be sued as if sole, by
necessary implication intended to repeal the common law rule. "The
. having been
legal unity which was the reason of the rule .
swept away by the act, the liability is swept away. The reason being
dissolved, the rule cannot exist." 10 In Arizona, in a well-considered
case, the court reached a like conclusion by abolishing the rule that
1
statutes in derogation of the common law shall be strictly construed. '
Pennsylvania has .cast in her lot with the minority jurisdictions,
but the evolution of the rule in that State has been interesting. The
'Morgan v. Kennedy, 62 Minn. 348, 64 N. W. 912 (i895) ; Poling v. Pick70 W. Va. 117, 73 S. E. 251 (1911).
'Edwards v. Porter, [1925] A. C. i. The question was one of first impression in the House of Lords, and was decided by a majority of three to two.
'Harrington v. Jagmetty, 83 N. J. L. 548, 83 Atl. 88o (1912). See also
Wolff'& Co. v. Lozier, 68 N. J.L. 1o3, xo7, 52 AtI. 303, 304 (1902).
.'Quilty v. Battie, 135 N. Y. 2ox, 32 N. E. 47 (1892). But cf. Missio v.
Williams, 129 Tenn. 504, 167 S. W. 473 (914), where on similar facts a
contrary result was reached, in the absence of such statutes.
'Baum v. Mullen, 47 N. Y. 577 (1872).
" Humphreys, J., in Bourland v. Baker, 141 Ark. 280, 285, 216 S. W. 707,
709 (1g9g). '"While they [married women's property acts] do not expressly
repeal the common law rule that the husband is liable for the torts of his wife,
they have made such modifications of his rights and her disabilities as wholly
to remove the reason for the liability." Thornton, I., in Martin v. Robson, 65
Ill. x29, 132 (1872).
ens,

' Hageman v. Vanderdoes, 15 Ariz. 312, f38 Pac. 1053 (1914).

NOTES

Act of 184812 provided that the property of a married woman was
not liable for her husband's debts, and that she could hold property
in the same way as a ferne sole. The purpose of this Act was construed to be to protect the wife's separate estate against her husband's
creditors, but not to permit her to enter into contracts with respect to
her separate estate.' It was held that there was no general removal
of her disabilities, and her husband was, therefore, still liable for her
torts.'

4

The Act of 1887 1 provided that the wife might sue and be sued
either upon such contracts as she was therein authorized to make, "or
for torts done to or committed by her, in all respects as if she were a
feine sole, . . . and any debt, damages or costs recovered against
her . . . shall be payable out of her separate property and not
otherwise." Pursuant to this Act, a judgment against a husband and
wife for slanderous words spoken by the latter was held a nullity as
against the husband.'
This Act was specifically repealed and superseded by the
Act of 1893,17 which is similar to the typical married women's property acts. Under this Act, some lower courts held that the common
law liability of the husband was re-established, 8 while others found
no evidence that in the Act of 1893 19 the legislature had any intention of retracing its footsteps, and held that the husband was not
liable.2" However, it is now settled by the Supreme Court of the
the husband's common law liability is abrogated by this
State that
2
statute. 1
Whether the majority or minority view is correct is a much
mooted question. If the husband's liability depends upon the unity
of his wife's person with his own, then those jurists are correct who
contend that the enactment of the married women's property acts,
which destroy this legal fiction, by necessary implication altered the
common law.
But we have seen that the liability is not based on that ground.
Rather it is based on the reciprocal duties of protection and service

"P. L. 536, § 6, Pa. St. 192o, § 14586.

v. Bear, 33 Pa.
U Pettit v. Fretz, 33 Pa. 1x8 (i859) ; Bear's Adm'r
(1859).
"Quick v. Miller, 1o3 Pa. 67 (1883).
a P. L. 333.
"Kuklence v. Vogt, io Sadler ir, 13 Atl. 198 (Pa., 1888).
" P. L. 344, §§ r, 2, Pa. St. 192o, §§ 14569, 14570.

525

'Ridgeway v. Speelman, 7 Pa. D. R. 290 (1898). But if the husband
was not joined as a defendant, his property was not liable to execution on a
judgment recovered against the wife alone. Deardorff v. Pepple, 36 Pa. Super.
224

(1908).
"Supra, note 17.
"Whitehouse v. Wisser, 40 Pa. C. C. 463 (igog) ; cf. Hinski v. Stein, 68

Pa. Super. 44! (1917).
'Gustine v. Westenberger,

224

Pa. 455, 73 At. 913 (igog) ; Smith v. Ma-

chesney, 238 Pa. 538, 86 Atl. 493 (913).
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as between husband and wife, and the property acts do not, in themselves, effect any express change in the duty of service and obedience on the wife's part, nor do they abolish the reciprocal obligation
of "protection" cast on the husband. And it is out of this duty that
the husband's liability for his wife's torts would seem to arise.
Nevertheless, while the retention of the common law theory can
be justified upon a strict consideration'of the law, it cannot be defended on practical grounds. The old rights of the husband are utterly gone; today, marriage gives a husband no real rights, but imposes upon him burdens and obligations. The old reciprocity is, as a
matter of fact, obsolete.
Nor is it an unanswerable argument that frequently the wife is
without property upon which the injured plaintiff may proceed to
execution. Many injured br the negligence of those who are not
married women have found this state of affairs preventing their just
compensation. Such a condition will always exist, until everyone becomes responsible and can be forced to reimburse those whom his
negligence or wilfulness has damaged.
Notwithstanding the evident desirability of a change from the
old rule, the courts are not the proper agencies to bring it about. The
remedy lies with the legislature, and were the courts to attempt it
they would be guilty of "judicial legislation." They may only interpret existing laws. Therefore, as the married women's property acts
do not eliminate, either expressly or by implicaiton, the husband's
liability for his wife's torts, it is believed that the case of Sargeant v.
Fedor was correctly decided.
J.F.E.H.

TENDER OF DOCUMENTS UNDER A LETTER OF CREDIT AS

AF-

point of considerable interest to banks and merchants was recently adjudicated in2
the case of Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. v. National City Bank.
The defendant Pan-American Bank, on behalf of its customer, a
buyer of sugar, wished to issue a letter of credit to the seller in Brazil,
FECTED BY CUSTOMS OF THE PLACE OF TENDEAI-A

'This note contemplates the situation where the seller, at a distance from
the buyer, to whom he has agreed to sell goods, is named as the beneficiary
of the letter of credit procured by the buyer from a bank, authorizing the seller
to draw on the bank by drafts accompanied by shipping documents, which
usually include a bill of lading carrying title to the goods, an invoice and insurance against risks during the voyage or trip. The term "letter of credit"
as used here always refers to such commercial letters of credit and not to the
familiar travellers letter of credit.
For discussions of commercial letters of credit in general, see Omer F.
Hershey, Letters of Credit, 32 HARv. L. REv. I; W. E. McCurdy, Commercial
Letters of Credit, 35 Hnv. L. REv. 539, 715, and Right of the Beneficiary under
Commercial Letters of Credit, 37 HARv. L. REV. 323; C. A. Mead, Documentary Letters of Credit, 22 CoL. L. REv. 297.
'6 Fed. (2d) 762 (C. C. A., 1925).
-

NOTES

but, being unknown there, procured its issuance by the plaintiff bank
in New York. The letter authorized the seller to draw on the plaintiff, up to an aggregate amount, by sight drafts when accompanied
by invoices, insurance and bills of lading. The plaintiff's branch in
Rio honored drafts accompanied by. bills of lading reciting that the
sugar was loaded on board the steamer T, or another steamer belonging to the same line, and insurance covering the goods on the T
only. The buyer failed, and the defendant refused to reimburse the
plaintiff for the payments on the drafts. A judgment recovered by
the plaintiff was affirmed on appeal, Circuit Judge Hand dissernting.
The majority of the court held that the documents offered by the
seller constituted a valid tender under the letter of credit, since the
defendant's agreement, in the absence of any stipulation otherwise,
necessarily implied an assent to the plaintiff's acting in accordance
with such laws and usages as it encountered in the place where its
promise was to be fulfilled, and bills of lading of the kind in suit
were universally used in Rio and recognized as valid under the local
law.
The opinion finds support in the practical consideration that
transactions under letters of credit will be simplified and facilitated
by making the credit available according to the accepted customs
and usages of the place where it obviously will be used; 3 for if, as the
opinion points out, the rule be that the documents accompanying the
draft in one country must conform to the standards of the place of
issuance in another country, "no one negotiating a draft to be so interpreted can, by any reasonable exercise of intelligence, know whether
what he buys in Tokio or Rio will be good in New York or London,
and this makes a mere trap out of what is intended to be an aid to
commerce." , It would, of course, be within the power of the issuing bank to safeguard itself against the operation of any custom in a
foreign country, to a seller in which it extends its credit, by making it
a condition precedent to the payment of any drafts drawn under the
letter that the accompanying documents conform to the standards prevailing at the place of issuance. 5 The bank would then be able to
protect itself from paying drafts drawn by a seller who neglects to
offer with them the requisite documents, for the courts universally
hold that the bank as the writer of the letter of credit will not be
bound to accept and pay bills and drafts drawn against it unless the
holder of the letter pursues and conforms in every material particular to the authority conferred therein." If the documents do not
'In this case, Rio; by means of negotiation of drafts by the plaintiff's

branch there.

'Ibid., p. 768.
'Pan-American Bank v. Nat. City Bank, supra, note 2, p. 768.
'International Banking Corp. v. Irving Nat. Bank, 274 Fed. 122 (D. C.,
192i), aff'd 283 Fed. xo3 (C. C. A., i9);
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyers'
Title and Trust Co., 297 Fed. 152 (C. C. A., 1924) ; Lamborn v. Lake Shore

Banking and Trust Co., 196 App. Div. 5o4, i88 N. Y. Supp. 162

(1921).
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conform to the terms of the letter the bank is allowed, as against the
seller,' not to pay the drafts, and cannot by paying put the buyer
under a duty to indemnify. 8 So, too, where the requirements of
the letter of credit have not been complied with, a bank which negotiates the drafts cannot recover from the issuing bank."
The proposition advanced in the 4najority opinion would seem
to be acceptable in general as expediting the extensive dealings carried on by means of letters of credit, but when it is applied to the
facts of the present case one might doubt the wisdom of the decision,
at least after a reading of the searching dissenting opinion of Judge
Hand. 11 His dissent is based in part upon a refusal to recognize as a
compliance with the terms of the letter a tender of insurance covering the goods only when on the T, with accompanying bills of lading
which would be satisfied if the goods were lifted by some vessel other
than the T. The bank would not under such documents be protected
if the goods did not go on the T, and for the error of its Rio branch
in overlooking such a discrepancy it could not recover from the
certainly to make recovery for
buyer.11 The policy tendered ought
12the bank on inspection of the
and
buyer,
the
to
available
lost goods
documents should determine for its own 13protection whether the
The majority opinion
terms of the letter have been complied with.
has attempted to meet this objection to the sufficiency of the documents by saying: "The Rio branch was then justified in what it did
by the usage of the place and trade, and by the representations of
documents furnished by Barcellos (the seller), which, considered
together, represented to even a most cautious mind that the sugar was
on board the T; for Barcellos offered a set of papers which in terms
asserted that Barcellos had put it there. No other interpretation
could be given to such a bill confirmed and explained by the insurLamborn v. Lake Shore Banking and Trust Co., supra, note 5.
'Bank of Montreal v.Recknagel, 1o9 N. Y. 482, 17 N. E. 217 (1888).
The court qualified the rule by dictum on pages 488 and 494 to the effect that
the buyer would be held liable if such facts existed as would have authorized
a recital of them in the documents in conformity with the requirements of the
letter of credit See Lamborn v. Lake Shore B. & T. Co., supra, note 5,P.
5o7, 188 N. Y. Supp. 164; Nat. City Bank v. Seattle Nat. Bank, 121 Wash.
476, 484, 209 Pac. 705, 707 (I922).
'Brazilian & Portuguese Bank v. British & Am. Exch. Banking Corp., 18
Law Times R. 823 (Eng., 1868); Chartered Bank of India v. MacFayden &
Co., 64 L. J. Q. B. 367 (Eng., 1895).
' Pan-American Bank v. Nat City Bank, supra, note 2, p. 769.
'Bank of Montreal v. Recknagel, supra, note 7.
" Cf. Wilson, Holgate and Co. v. Belgian Grain and Produce Co., [i92o]
2 K. B. i.
"In Borthwick v. Bank of New Zealand, 17 Times L. P. 2 (Eng., igoo),
it was held that a bank was not protected when, under a letter of credit requiring, among other documents, an insurance policy, it honored drafts accompanied by a policy of insurance which was not broad enough to cover the risk
of certain injuries actually suffered by the goods when on board ship.

NOTES

ance policy." 14 It would still be difficult to perceive how a bank
which inspected the papers could logically treat an insurance policy
inconsistent with bills of lading as explanatory of them. Inasmuch
as transactions under commercial letters of credit are conducted on a
large scale and require some degree of speed, banks should decide
upon their liability by a mere inspection of the accompanying papers,
without inquiring into facts aliunde.'5 The Rio branch here ought
not to have been concerned with any investigation as to whether the T
had in fact lifted the sugar.
It is to be observed that the court apparently confined its recognition of Brazilian law and custom solely to the validity of the bills
of lading. As far as they are concerned, it is submitted that the decision is sound from the viewpoint of business practice, though there
seems to be a dearth of authority on the precise point involved."6
Whether or not it was the established local custom to regard insurance of the sort here offered by the seller as good and sufficient in
connection with such bills of lading, does not clearly appear; but
recognition of such a custom regarding the insurance, even if shown,
would differ from the court's recognition of the validity of the bills
of lading, in that it would deny an important provision of the contract contained in the letter of credit, ,iz., that the issuing bank
should be protected by insurance. Sanction of such an insurance policy as the one here offered would mean that the bank would get no
protection in the contingency of the goods not going on the ship
named in the policy, and would hence entail the necessity of saying
that a party who stipulated for insurance as a condition to his contractual obligation might be bound in spite of the fact that he got
none. For this reason, it would seem that the defendant, while it
impliedly assented to the plaintiff's acting in accordance with the
laws and customs of Brazil when it induced the plaintiff to issue the
letter, still could be taken as assenting only to whatever laws and
customs did not violate its clear contractual rights. As to the bills
of lading, while they may not have been perfectly acceptable in New
York, the acceptance of them in this case did not deprive the bank
of any substantial part of what it had bargained for.
.H. W.
1
Pan-American Bank and Trust Co. v. Nat. City Bank, supra, note 2, p.
769.
(192-4). Cf. Laudisi v. Am. Exch. Nat. Bank, 239 N. Y. 234, 146 N. E. 347
"O'Meara v. Nat. Park Bank, 239 N. Y. 386, 146 N. R. 636 (1925) ; see
International Banking Corp. v. Irving Nat. Bank, supra, note 5, 274 Fed. r=,
125.
%Cf.

Vietor v. Nat. City Bank, 2oo App. Div. 557, 193 N. Y. Supp. 868

(i92) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Columbia Trust Co., 21o App. Div. 705, 2o6
N. Y. Supp. 257 (1924). But cf. Sovereign Bank v. Bellhouse, 23 Queb. K. B.
413 (II1).
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WHEN Do RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS ON LAND BECOME UNENFORCEABLE?-Granting that there is a valid building restriction

against land and that there has been no contract of release between
the interested parties, the considerations which move a court of equity
to refuse an injunction, to prevent a violation of such restriction, divide into three groups: (i) a change in the character of the neighborhood in which the land is situated; (2) laches by the party seeking
the injunction; (3) an implied waiver by the party seeking the injunction.
Whether there has been such a change in the character of the
neighborhood as to make it inequitable to issue an injunction depends, to a large extent, upon the facts of each case. Generally it
may be said that when the change in the neighborhood has been
such that the purpose of the restriction has been defeated, a violation will not be restrained.1 It would be oppressive to prevent the
defendant from using his land as the neighboring land is being used
and would not, in proportion, benefit the plaintiff, nor in any degree
aid in accomplishing the purpose of the restriction.2 Thus when
lands are limited to private residences, "to provide for the better
improvement of the lands and to secure their permanent value," a
change in the neighborhood so that it becomes a business section will
make it inequitable to grant an injunction. The purpose has been
defeated and granting the injunction in the particular case will not
"provide for the better improvement of the lands and secure their
permanent value," but have exactly the opposite effect.8 When the
restrictive covenant is limited to a number of years, and the greater
part of that time has elapsed, equity listens with more than usual attention to the plea of a change in the neighborhood.' This, it seems,
is correct, since the rights of the plaintiff are much less than in the
ordinary case, and, in a short time will be of no value at all. Damages will be adequate, and the parties should be left to an action at
law. Where, however, the change has had no effect upon the purpose of the restriction an injunction will be granted. Thus, a restriction that no building shall be erected above a certain height is held
to be created for the purpose of affording'light and air to the adjacent properties and will be enforced even though the neighborhood
has changed to one containing many high office buildings. The
change in the neighborhood has had no effect on the purpose of the
restriction. 5 The law upon the subject is by no means settled, however, for there are cases which hold that, even though there has been

'Amerman v. Deane, z32 N. Y. 355, 30 N. F. 741 (I892); McClure v.
Leaycraft, 183 N. Y. 36, 75 N. E. 961 (1o95) ; Page v. Murray, 46 N. J. Eq.
476, ig AtL ii

(i89o); Land Co. v. Weber, 83 N. J. Eq. 476, 91 Atl. 6oo

(914).

2Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 3X N. F. 691 (189I).
*Trustees v. Thatcher, 87 N. Y. 311 (I882).
' McClure v. Leaycraft, supra, note x; Page v. Murray, supra, note x.
Landell v. Hamilton, x75 -Pa. 327, 34 At. 663 (1896).

'
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a change in the neighborhood which affects the purpose. of the reupon the enforcement as
striction, the plaintiff has a right to insist
6
long as it is of any value to him at all. The restriction cannot be
considered removed merely because equity will not grant an injunction, since there is still a possibility of an action for permanent damages, which will be the difference between the value of the plaintiff's
lot with, and without, the restriction on the defendant's lot. These
may be only nominal, but, on the other hand, may be very substantial. 7 Sometimes, equity will, though refusing the injunction, award
damages as its decree in the case before it." In other cases, no damages are given, but the decree is so framed that it will not be a bar
to a suit at law for damages. 9
Where there is no question of a change in the character of the
neighborhood, ground for the refusal of an injunction must be found
in the actions of the person seeking to enforce the restriction. If he
has been guilty of laches, the court will refuse to restrain the violator, 10 since diligence is an essential prerequisite to equitable relief of
this nature. What constitutes laches is also a question which must be
decided, to a large extent, upon the facts of each *case. Generally,
any delay which allows the violator of a restriction to incur expense,
or enter into obligations, or in any other way change his position will
be ground for equity to refuse an injunction. It would be inequitable to restrain the defendant when he has been led to believe that
there will be no objection. It would seem, however, that one who
when there
knowingly defies the rights of others can complain only
11
has been a delay greater than in the ordinary case, since he, regardless of his duty, has taken a chance that no one would object.
When the restriction has been imposed on this lot in common with
other lots in the neighborhood, so that there are mutual rights among
all the owners, the fact that the property has been used for a long
period of time in violation of the restriction will defeat the ordinary
case for an injunction. But it will not defeat the restriction so as to
when the vendor
have equity enforce a contract to buy the property,
12
has contracted to convey free of all restrictions, so that the title is
not clear. The reason is that, among so many who had rights in the
restriction, it is probable that some are not sui juris, or outside of the
country, so that the doctrine of laches will not affect them.
'Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 34 N. E. 765 (1893) ; Alderson v. Cutting, 163 Cal. 503, 126 Pac. 157 (I912); Lattimer v. Livermore, 72 N. Y.
174 (1873).

'Amerman v. Deane, supra, note i; McClure v. Leaycraft, supra, note r.

"Amerman v. Deane, supra, note i.
'McClure v. Leaycraft, supra, note x.
'St. Andrew's Church's Appeal, 67 Pa. 512 (1871); Orne v. Fridenberg,
143 Pa. 487, 22 Adt. 832 (i8gi).
'Stewart v. Finkelstone, 206 Mass. 28, 92 N. E. 37 (1910).
'Crocker v. Construction Co., 249 Fed. 31 (C. C. A., 1918).
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Equity will also refuse to restrain the violation of a restriction
when the person trying to enforce the restriction has,/by his acts,
impliedly waived his rights to the enforcement. These cases group
into two classes: (i) where the plaintiff has permitted the defendant
to violate the restriction to a certain extent, and then tries to prevent
further violation; (2) where he, himself, has violated the restriction.
It is universally held in the first class of cases that the plaintiff has
waived his rights only to the extent of the defendant's violation and
that any further violation, either in kind or degree, will be restrained
s
by an injunction.1

The reason given is that the plaintiff has de-

clared that his rights to such an extent, but to that extent only, are
vralueless to him, and he cannot retract that assertion. 14 In the second
class of cases there is a division of opinion. The majority view is
that the plaintiff by his violation has waived his right only to that
extent."5 The reasoning is the same as that in the first class of
cases, with the additional reason that the plaintiff does not come into
court with clean hands. The minority view disregards the extent of
the violation by the party seeldng enforcement and holds that, having
violated the restriction, he cannot be heard to complain that another
is violating the same restriction, but to a greater extent.'6 It is submitted that the extent of the violation by the plaintiff is material and
should not be disregarded, as is done in the minority view. A party
should not be deprived of a valuable right because of a relatively
small violation.
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